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MANDATORY ANTITRUST LAW AND MULTIPARTY 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
ALEXANDRA THEOBALD 
So many vows.  They make you swear and swear.  Defend the King, 
obey the King, obey your father, protect the innocent, defend the 
weak.  But what if your father despises the King?  What if the King 
massacres the innocent?  It’s too much.  No matter what you do, 
you’re forsaking one vow or another.1  
 
What is an arbitrator to do?  In recent years a choice of law 
doctrine has developed in international arbitration that requires the 
application of so-called “mandatory law” to antitrust issues.  At the 
same time an increasing complexity in cross-border transactions has 
led to an increase in multiparty arbitrations, further complicating 
the choice of law analysis.  As multiparty arbitrations increasingly 
address competition law issues, tribunals must grapple with the 
tension between party autonomy and possibly conflicting 
mandatory laws.   
Almost all countries now allow the settlement of private 
disputes through arbitration.2  Tribunals are empowered to issue 
binding awards by the agreement of contracting parties.3  Consent, 
or party autonomy, is considered the most important principle in 
international arbitration because parties essentially waive their right 
to adjudication by a court.4  The benefit of this arrangement is that 
                                                     
1 Game of Thrones: A Man Without Honor (HBO television broadcast May 13, 
2012). 
2 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(New York, 1958) Status, UNCITRAL, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/un-
citral_texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html [perma.cc/XTH8-S6GF] (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2015) (listing 154 countries who are party to the Convention of ap-
proximately 190 total countries in the world). 
3 PHILLIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN, 
FOUCHARD GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 9-10 
(Emmanuel Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999) [hereinafter GAILLARD] (describing 
various national definitions of arbitration as a form of binding agreement between 
the parties). 
4 NIGEL BLACKABY ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL 
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parties can resolve their disputes in a neutral forum5 and enjoy 
easier enforcement in foreign jurisdictions where the losing party’s 
assets may be located.6  Arbitral awards are enforceable around the 
world in any country that has signed on to the New York 
Convention.7   
This note will address the potential conflicts arbitral tribunals 
encounter when deciding antitrust law issues in international 
arbitration.  It will be argued that the application of mandatory law 
creates irreconcilable conflicts that increase costs and detract from 
the benefits of international arbitration.  The scope of the choice of 
law problems is most readily apparent in multiparty arbitration, 
though many of the same concerns apply equally to two-party 
arbitration.  The issue of conflicting mandatory antitrust laws in 
arbitration is important given the rise of multi-national corporations 
whose continued growth is constrained by a jumble of competition 
regulations.  More than 111 countries currently have competition 
law regimes, the vast majority of which have been adopted only 
within the past 25 years.8  Furthermore, the stakes are high and 
judgments can reach into the billions of dollars in a single case.9    
                                                     
ARBITRATION, 19 ¶ 1.52 (5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter REDFERN & HUNTER] (noting that 
consent is essential to a valid arbitration, which in effect functions as a “denation-
alized or delocalized” proceeding).  See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, art. 7(1) (1985) (amended 2006) [hereinafter “MODEL 
LAW”], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/ arbitration/ml-
arb/07-86998_Ebook.pdf [perma.cc/5V49-RAZD] (stating that arbitration is “an 
agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have 
arisen or which may arise . . . .”). 
5 Some national courts tend to favor local parties.  See Damjan Kukovec, 
International Antitrust – What law in action?¸ 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 35, (2004) 
(describing an empirical study that revealed that judges of the ICJ, whose country 
is a litigant, vote more frequently in their country’s favor). 
6 GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 73 n. 518 (2nd ed. 
2014) (“There is no ‘universal’ convention on the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments, parallel to the New York Convention for arbitral awards.”). 
7 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, art. 3 (New York, 1958) [hereinafter New York Convention], available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/NY-conv/New-York-
Convention-E.pdf [https://perma.cc/YL2D-WV7B] (“Each Contracting State shall 
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them . . .”); see BORN, supra note 6, 
at 109 (“[C]entral to the Convention are Articles III, IV and V, which establish a 
basic rule of validity and enforceability of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards 
falling within the scope of the Convention.”). 
8 Anestis S. Papadopoulos, The International Dimension of EU Competition 
Law and Policy 15 (2010). 
9 See, e.g., Christie Smythe & Christian Dolmetsch, Visa, Mastercard $5.7 Billion 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/5
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The discussion that follows is divided into six sections.  Section 
one outlines the current legal basis for resolving antitrust issues in 
arbitration, and highlights concerns regarding preclusive effects, 
multiparty arbitrations, and the requirement of equal treatment.10  
Section two explores the major considerations in the choice of 
substantive law analysis.11  It discusses the foundations of the 
applicability of mandatory law to antitrust disputes and examines 
the ways in which the choice of mandatory law may impact the 
outcome of the proceeding.  Section three suggests solutions for 
arbitrators (and arguments to be made by the parties) to resolve 
statutory antitrust law issues in multiparty arbitration.12  
Considerations of enforceability are weighed against the 
countervailing interest of party autonomy and predictability in 
contracting.  Section four discusses the implications of the choice of 
law problems on forum shopping and contract drafting.  Finally, 
section five recommends policy changes for courts and legislators to 
address the concerns raised in the preceding part.13  Section six 
concludes.14   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
Swipe Fee Accord Approved, Bloomberg, Dec. 14, 2013, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-13/visa-mastercard-swipe-
fee-accord-approved-by-u-s-judge [perma.cc/NR5N-RSRE] (reporting the EU 
fined Intel 1.06 billion euros for monopolizing the computer chip industry); James 
Kanter, European Court Upholds $1.44 Billion Fine Against Intel, N.Y. Times, June 12, 
2014, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/13/business/international/ 
european-court-upholds-1-06-billion-fine-against-intel.html?_r=0                     
[perma.cc/Z63Y-DNN7] (describing “years of litigation” over claims that credit-
card swipe fees were improperly fixed). 
10 See infra p. 5. 
11 See infra p. 11. 
12 See infra p. 17. 
13 See infra p. 25. 
14 See infra p. 29. 
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1.  ARBITRABILITY OF ANTITRUST ISSUES 
To better understand the basis for the current problems in 
antitrust arbitration, one must first consider the historical basis for 
resolving antitrust law issues in arbitration.  Initially thought un-
arbitrable,15 several jurisdictions in Europe and the United States 
now recognize the resolution of antitrust issues in limited 
circumstances.16  Under the broadest interpretation, arbitral 
tribunals have the authority to adjudicate a statutory private right 
of action under applicable national antitrust laws or when raised as 
a defense in arbitration.17   
1.1. In General 
Questions concerning the arbitrability of a claim may itself be 
dispositive in an arbitral proceeding.  Regardless of the merits of a 
case, an arbitral tribunal may not be permitted by law in a given 
jurisdiction to decide antitrust matters.  If the tribunal nevertheless 
issues an award, the losing party can challenge it on grounds of non-
arbitrability.18  National courts in the seat of arbitration usually issue 
                                                     
15 See American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 
(2nd Cir. 1968) (holding antitrust claims un-arbitrable due to public policy interest 
in ensuring proper enforcement). 
16 For a description of various country’s approaches to arbitration, see Alexis 
Mourre, Arbitrability of Antitrust Law from European and US Perspectives, in EU AND 
US ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 6-8 (Gordon Blanke & 
Phillip Landolt eds., 2011).  Arbitral tribunals can order the civil consequences of a 
violation of antitrust laws by enjoining a party to cease violating the other's rights, 
awarding damages, or invalidating the contract.  Id.; see also, JEFFREY KESSLER ET AL., 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAW § 8:16 (2nd ed. 2014) (describing 
arbitrability of antitrust claims in the United States).  For a historical perspective, 
see Ludwig von Zumbusch, Arbitrability of Antitrust Claims under U.S., German, and 
EEC law: the International Transaction Criterion and Public Policy, 22 TEX. INT’L L. J. 
291, 292 (Spring/Summer 1987) (describing the changing attitudes towards a more 
favorable view of arbitrability of antitrust claims). 
17 Mourre, supra 16, at 23 ¶ 1-078.  See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 634-38 (1985) (upholding arbitrability of 
counterclaimed violations under the Sherman Act). 
18 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(2)(a) (“Recognition and enforce-
ment of an arbitral award may be refused if [the] subject matter of the difference is 
not capable of settlement by arbitration. . .”). 
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interlocutory rulings on questions of arbitrability,19 though some 
institutional rules also allow the tribunal itself to make that 
determination.20   
The first prerequisite for an arbitrable claim is the existence of a 
private right of action.  Primarily Western jurisdictions have 
national laws that provide for private enforcement of antitrust or 
competition law claims, and have subsequently allowed such claims 
to be resolved in arbitration.21  For example, in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the United States Supreme 
Court held that an agreement to arbitrate was enforceable with 
respect to antitrust claims under foreign law, but only if the 
alternative forum would allow an opportunity to present its 
statutory antitrust law claim.22  This holding is problematic.  First it 
begs the question as to what qualifies as an “opportunity” to present 
a claim.23  National approaches to antitrust issues differ 
significantly.  Being afforded an opportunity to present arguments 
alone may not be enough to fulfill a party’s expectations.  What the 
party is really interested in is an opportunity to obtain specific kinds 
of relief, which may not be possible in all situations endorsed by the 
court.  For example, in the Mitsubishi case the plaintiff was forced to 
                                                     
19 Mourre, supra note 16, at 13 ¶ 1-030 (explaining that issues of arbitrability 
are usually decided by courts but may also be decided by arbitrators).  See also 
Douglas Yarn & Gregory Jones, Legal exclusions and special problems involving statu-
tory claims, in GEORGIA ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 
9:14 (2014) (“Federal courts have imposed public policy exceptions to the arbitra-
bility of certain claims under the FAA”). 
20 Elizabeth McCallum et al., Cover Stories: Arbitration Procedures, the Rules of the 
Road in Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes, 19 ANTITRUST A.B.A J. 15, 16-17 (describing 
variations in American case law on who decides arbitrability).  See also American 
Arbitration Association, Commercial Arbitration Rules, R-7(a) available at 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?nodeId=/UCM/ADRSTG_004103 
[perma.cc/NR5N-RSRE](establishing that a tribunal may rule on its own jurisdic-
tion).  But see ICDR, International Dispute Resolution Procedures (2014), available at 
https://www.adr.org/aaa/ShowProperty?no-
deId=/UCM/ADRSTAGE2020868&revision=latestreleased [perma.cc/Z63Y-
DNN7] (containing no provision for a tribunal’s jurisdiction to rule on issues of 
arbitrability). 
21 See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 614 (upholding arbitrability of antitrust 
claims under arbitration agreement requiring American plaintiff to arbitrate against 
Japanese defendant in Japan).   
22 Id. at 637. 
23 But see Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637 n. 19 (suggesting in dicta that choice 
of forum and choice of law clauses may waive access to statutory antitrust claims 
under U.S. law).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/5
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bring its antitrust claims in a forum much less favorable to 
providing antitrust relief.  Can this really be considered an adequate 
“opportunity” to present a claim?  The second problem with the 
Mitsubishi holding is that it endorses arbitration of a claim based on 
law other than the governing law of the contract.  As discussed 
below,24 deviating from the party’s choice of law detracts from the 
benefits of arbitration by introducing uncertainty and also impinges 
on party autonomy. 
1.2. Preclusive Effects 
The issue of preclusion in arbitration is highly debated.25  In 
general, claims decided in arbitration are given preclusive effect in 
any subsequent litigation between the same parties—as would be 
the case with a judgment issued by a court.26  Unlike a court 
judgment, however, arbitral awards are not subject to appeal and 
are afforded much greater deference by foreign courts.27  Under the 
New York Convention, arbitral awards can only be reviewed for 
procedural fairness and may not be challenged on the merits.28   
                                                     
24 See § 2 infra.  
25 See, BORN, supra note 6, at 1112 (“Although it is widely recognized that arbi-
tral awards have binding, res judicata effects, the precise nature of those effects . . . 
is debated.”); Gretta Walters, Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole: Do Res Judicata 
Challenges in International Arbitration Constitute Jurisdictional or Admissibility Prob-
lems? 29 J. Int’l Arb. 6, pp. 651-680. At 651 (2012) (“While the legal principle of res 
judicata is widely recognized in domestic laws and by international tribunals, its 
scope and meaning are unsettled topics.”); Compare Nathalie Voser & Julie Raneda, 
Recent Developments on the Doctrine of Res Judicata in International Arbitration from a 
Swiss Perspective: A Call for a Harmonized Solution, 33 ASA Bulletin Vol. 4, pp. 749-
779 (2015) (discussing various recent decisions in Switzerland on the preclusive ef-
fect of prior proceedings and setting a high bar for preclusion) with Katherine Jonck-
heere, Avoiding Re-litigation of Identical Issues at the Enforcement Stage: A Deferential 
Approach, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG February 3, 2016 (advocating a deferential ap-
proach) available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/ 2016/02/03/avoiding-re-
litigation-of-identical-issues-at-the-enforcement-stage-a-deferential-approach/ 
[https://perma.cc/B5F3-AHGZ]. 
26 Allen Scott Rau, The Arbitrator and Mandatory Rules of Law, 18 AM. REV. INT’L 
ARB. 51, 58 (2007) (agreeing that a decision on the merits on a statutory claim should 
and is intended to give “res judicata” effect to statutory claims under the holding 
in Mitsubishi); BORN, supra note 6, at 3738-3739 (preclusion is a matter of interna-
tional law). 
27 BORN, supra note 6, at 3185 (“An annulment court does not review the arbi-
tral tribunal’s decision in the nature of an appellate proceeding, but instead consid-
ers only whether one of a specified number of defined statutory grounds for annul-
ment is present.”). 
28 BORN, supra note 6, at 3185 citing New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 7. 
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Some have raised concerns that arbitration is an inappropriate 
forum to resolve antitrust issues.  Critics argue that the arbitral 
tribunal may not have the same expertise,29 and it certainly does not 
have the same public responsibilities as a state regulatory agency.  
Questions of market definition often benefit from third-party 
evidence—which a tribunal is unable to compel.30  Despite these 
concerns, considerations of party autonomy suggest that parties 
should be allowed to define the scope of their arbitration agreements 
to include antitrust issues, and the resulting awards should be given 
the same weight as adjudications by national courts or 
administrative agencies.  If arbitral decisions on antitrust issues 
really were inferior, parties would learn to exclude them from their 
arbitration agreements. 
Due to the contractual nature of the forum, arbitral awards can 
only have preclusive effect on the actual parties to the proceeding.31  
International arbitration is premised on consent, and should not 
purport to bind third parties.32  However, the very nature of 
antitrust law concerns market effects.33  A key distinction must 
therefore be made concerning the role of an arbitral tribunal in the 
resolution of antitrust issues in contrast to a regulatory authority.  
The goals of private party actions are “to secure relief and end 
misconduct,” whereas a public regulator also seeks to “effectuate 
                                                     
29 See Mourre, supra note 16, at 23 § 1-078 (noting arbitral tribunals will become 
more experienced with antitrust law issues as they are more frequently presented 
in arbitration). 
30 McCallum, supra note 20, at 7; Renato Nazzini, Parallel Proceedings before the 
Tribunal and the Courts/Competition Authorities, in EU AND US ANTITRUST 
ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTITIONERS 890-891 (Gordon Blanke & Phillip 
Landolt eds., 2011). 
31 See, BORN, supra note 6, at 3751 (“An award will have preclusive effects only 
if the subsequent proceedings involved the ‘parties’ to the arbitration or their ‘priv-
ies’”); See also, New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 2(1) (“Each Contracting State 
shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties undertake to submit 
to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may arise between 
them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractua1 or not, concern-
ing a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.”) (emphasis added). 
32 Id. See also Born, supra note 6, at 1407-08 (describing the nature of consent to 
arbitration); Granite Rock v. Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287 (2010) (re-
fusing to compel arbitration upon finding defendant did not consent to submit spe-
cific issue to arbitration).   
33 WILLIAM BLUMENTHAL & JAMES D. HURWITZ, Chapter 42: Alternative Dispute 
Resolution and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement in EU AND US 
ANTITRUST ARBITRATION: A HANDBOOK FOR PRACTIONERS (Kluwer Law International 
2011).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/5
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enforcement policies, establish precedent, explain new learning, 
earn broad compliance, and reestablish competition in the 
market.”34  The scope of the arbitral award must therefore be 
restricted to the issues presented by the parties, and cannot impose 
externalities on others who cannot take part in the arbitration.35  
1.3. Multiparty Arbitration 
As corporate structures and business transactions become more 
complex, arbitrations increasingly involve more than two parties.36  
Antitrust cases in particular commonly involve multiple parties in 
part because any allegation of collusion necessarily involves more 
than one co-conspirator and therefore more than one potential 
defendant.  When multiple parties are involved in a dispute, they 
have an interest in efficiently resolving their dispute in a single 
arbitration that is binding on all of them.37  Requiring parties to 
arbitrate their claims separately is inefficient and has the potential 
to generate inconsistent and unfair results.38   
                                                     
34 Id. 
35 Regulatory agencies often allow public comment or the submission of ami-
cus briefs by third-parties that might potentially be affected by an impending reg-
ulatory decision.  This type of participation generally is not possible in the arbitra-
tion context.  See BERNARD HANOTIAU, COMPLEX ARBITRATION: MULTIPARTY, 
MULTICONTRACT, MULTI-ISSUE AND CLASS ACTIONS 192 (Kluwer Law International 
2006) (noting that briefs amicus curiae generally are not allowed in arbitrations 
other than under NAFTA, ICSID, or the WTO).  But see JEFF WAINCYMER, The Process 
of an Arbitration: Complex Arbitration, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION  602 (2012), at 602 (“[A]micus submissions have been accepted in dis-
putes which have a strong public interest dimension, in particular investor-state 
and competition law disputes . . . .”). 
36 JULIAN D. M. LEW ET AL., COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION 376 (KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL 2003) [hereinafter Lew] About 40% 
of arbitration cases worldwide involve more than two parties, and that number has 
been rapidly increasing for twenty years. Nathalie Voser, Multiparty Disputes and 
Joinder of Third Parties, in Albert Jan van den Berg (ed.), 50 years of the New York 
Convention: ICCA International Arbitration Conference, Vol 14, pp. 343-410 at 342 
(2009). 
37 Id. This analysis assumes that there is a valid arbitration agreement binding 
on all parties.  In the absence of a pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate, parties may 
conclude an arbitration agreement after a dispute has arisen.  Alternatively, some 
jurisdictions at least in the U.S. have been willing to extend jurisdiction of an arbi-
tral tribunal over parties who are accused of colluding with a party to an arbitration 
agreement.  See JLM Indus. V. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F .3d 163, 178 (2d Cir. 2004); MS 
Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F .3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999); Fujian Pac. Elec. Co. 
v. Bechtel Power Corp., 2004 WL 2645974, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2004). 
38 Lew, supra note 36, at 377. 
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 In multiparty arbitration, an important consideration is the 
requirement that all parties must receive equal treatment in 
resolving their dispute.39  This includes a responsibility to only 
consider the issues and evidence presented by parties to the 
arbitration agreement and to avoid being influenced by outsiders 
who are not part of the arbitration.40  To do otherwise would violate 
the notion that arbitration is a product of individual party autonomy 
and could potentially risk non-enforcement of the award.41  
Arbitration is a product of contract and the tribunal’s authority 
derives entirely from the authority granted by the parties.42  By 
choosing arbitration, the parties waive a quite substantial right—the 
right to trial.  Much like a court is limited to considering only issues 
within its subject matter jurisdiction on evidence properly admitted, 
it would be inapposite for an arbitral tribunal to consider issues 
beyond the scope granted by the parties or to consider evidence that 
the parties themselves have not supplied.  In the context of antitrust 
law claims, this means that arbitrators should only consider the 
evidence and legal positions actually provided by the parties in the 
dispute.   
Equal treatment also requires that the parties retain substantially 
the same substantive rights and remedies in arbitration as would be 
available under national law.  For example, by statute national 
courts and the European Commission have the ability to give 
individual exemptions to parties under existing competition laws 
for policy reasons.43  If a party instead chooses to go to arbitration, 
the arbitrator must have the ability to grant the same exemption.44  
Provisions like this complicate multiparty arbitration, however, 
because not all parties may be subject to the same laws and thus 
exemptions may be available for some but not others.   
                                                     
39 Id. at 408. 
40 Id. 
41 See New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(1)(c) (“Recognition and en-
forcement of the award may be refused [if the] award deals with a difference not 
contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or 
contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration. . 
.”). 
42 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 329 ¶ 5.48 (describing the contractual 
school of arbitration which posits that the relationship between the arbitrators and 
the parties is one of contract).  See also Rau, supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
43 Mourre, supra note 16, at 46 n. 261 (noting that equal treatment is impli-
cated by the availability of an exemption under Article 81(3)). 
44 Id.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/5
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Further, questions concerning joinder and consolidation are 
particularly salient in this context.  On the one hand, adding 
additional parties to the arbitration has the potential to drastically 
change the scope of the legal issues in the proceeding and may 
increase the amount of evidence available to the tribunal.45  On the 
other hand, the complications resulting from the application of 
multiple mandatory antitrust laws raise concerns over the ability of 
a tribunal to issue an enforceable award that is binding on all 
parties.46  This is an important concern, because unequal treatment 
of the parties in arbitration is grounds for non-enforcement of the 
arbitral award.47   
2.  CHOICE OF LAW ANALYSIS  
Choice of law in international arbitration can have a 
determinative effect not only on the outcome of a dispute, but also 
on whether a claim is even heard by a tribunal in the first place.  
Uncertainty surrounding the choice of law is a cost born by the 
parties and makes alternate dispute resolution by arbitration less 
attractive. 48   
The relevant points to keep in mind are that parties are free to 
select the governing law of the contract49 and that of the arbitration 
agreement,50 and these choices are generally upheld under 
principles of party autonomy.51  Nevertheless, some have argued 
                                                     
45 LEW, supra note 35, at 408. 
46 YVES DERAINS & ERIC SCHWARTZ, GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION, 
183 (2nd ed. 2005) (noting that due to enforcement concerns, tribunals constituted 
under the ICC rules have used the consolidation provision “sparingly”).  
47 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(1)(c). 
48 See BORN, supra note 6, at 900-01 (“The choice-of-law complexities that arise 
in international arbitration do not comport with the ideals of predictability and ef-
ficiency of the arbitral process.”); Charles Brower II, Arbitration and Antitrust: Navi-
gating the Contours of Mandatory Law, 59 BUFFALO L. REV. 1172, 1132, 1140 (2011) 
(Whether through continued application by tribunals, or continued enforcement by 
national courts, “the pursuit of expediency outside the normal bounds of party au-
tonomy seems likely to harm the integrity of the arbitral process”). 
49 Also referred to as the lex contractus. 
50 Also referred to as the lex arbitri. 
51 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 195-96 ¶¶ 3.94, 3.97.  See, e.g., LCIA Ar-
bitration Rules, London Court of International Arbitration, (2014 Amendments) art. 
22.3 available at http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitra-
tion-rules-2014.aspx [perma.cc/GXK3-CQJB] (“The Arbitral Tribunal shall decide 
the parties' dispute in accordance with the law(s) or rules of law chosen by the par-
ties as applicable to the merits of their dispute.”). 
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that at least in the context of statutory claims, we should not assume 
“that the law that may govern the performance of the substantive 
terms of their bargain tells us everything we need to know about the 
merits of . . . extra-contractual causes of action.”52  
With respect to antitrust issues, the choice of law applied to 
arbitrability as well as the choice of law governing the substance of 
the dispute may be determinative.  The lex arbitri governing the 
procedural issues (e.g. whether the dispute is arbitrable) is likely to 
be governed by a body of law that is different from that applied to 
the merits (e.g. the standard for evaluating a substantive claim).53  
The topic of this note focuses on the latter: however similar issues 
are also presented by the conflict of laws rules applied to 
arbitrability.54   
2.1. Foundations of Mandatory Law 
Despite most national arbitration laws authorizing the tribunal 
to look to principles of international law55 and to supplement the 
governing law absent express agreement by the parties,56 the 
                                                     
52 Rau, supra note 26, at 65.  
53 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 173 ¶ 3.34 (noting that since arbitration 
is often seated in a “neutral” jurisdiction, the procedural law will generally be dif-
ferent from the law that governs the substantive matters in the dispute). 
54 For example, many of the arguments made regarding the multiplicity of con-
flicting mandatory substantive laws may also arise with respect to questions of ar-
bitrability.  A national court could potentially refuse to enforce an award with re-
spect to antitrust issues on either the arbitrability ground or the public policy 
ground.  See New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(2) (enforcement of an award 
may be refused if “[t]he subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement 
by arbitration under the law of that country, or [. . .] enforcement of the award 
would be contrary to public policy.”).  
55 MODEL LAW, supra note 4, art. 2A (“In the interpretation of this Law, regard 
is to be had to its international origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its 
application.”). 
56 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 235 ¶ 3.222 (summarizing the intention 
of the model law and various arbitration rules to allow the arbitral tribunal to select 
the governing law in absence of agreement by the parties, and to allow for the ap-
plication of individual rules from various jurisdictions to different aspects of a dis-
pute).  See e.g., ICC Arbitration Rules, International Chamber of Commerce, (2012 
Amendments) art. 21(1), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/products-and-ser-
vices/arbitration-and-adr/arbitration/icc-rules-of-arbitration/                                
[perma.cc/2YZS-C2SS] [hereinafter ICC Arbitration Rules] (“In the absence of [. . .] 
agreement, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the rules of law which it determines to 
be appropriate”); MODEL LAW, supra note 4, at art. 28 (“Failing any designation by 
the parties, the arbitral tribunal shall apply the law determined by the conflict of 
laws rules which it considers applicable”). 
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application of foreign law to the resolution of antitrust law issues 
has proven particularly difficult.  When antitrust issues first became 
arbitrable, many jurisdictions refused to enforce awards under the 
public policy exception in Article V of the New York Convention.57  
National courts objected to the perceived incursion of arbitral 
tribunals into the sphere of market regulation58 and feared that 
arbitral tribunals would reduce the deterrent effect by incorrectly 
adjudicating claims on the merits more favorably to would-be 
defendants than if a claim were brought in open court.59   
Citing requirements under institutional rules to make “best 
efforts” to render enforceable awards,60 tribunals shifted their choice 
of law analysis to account for possible public policy objections of the 
jurisdictions where enforcement is most likely to occur.61  
Commonly referred to as the “mandatory law” because of its 
perceived unavoidability, it does not in fact refer to any uniform 
body, law or method of interpretation.   
Different jurisdictions apply varying levels of scrutiny to the 
                                                     
57 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. 5(2) (“Recognition and enforcement 
of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in the country 
where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: [. . .] the recognition or 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country”).  
See Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton International NV, Case C-126/97 (Euro-
pean Ct. of Justice 1999) (upholding applicability of European Competition law as 
public policy exception to enforcement of arbitral award). 
58 C.f. Kukovec, supra note 5, at 1 (describing the European Commission and 
the United States Federal Trade Comission’s blocking of the General Electric/Hon-
eywell and Boeing/McDonnell Douglas mergers as “almost escalat[ing] into a trade 
war).  
59 Mark Lee, Antitrust and Commercial Arbitration: An Economic Analysis, 62 
St. John L. Rev. 1, 4 (2012). 
60 See, e.g., ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 56, art. 41 (“[T]he arbitral tribu-
nal shall act in the spirit of the Rules and shall make every effort to make sure that 
the award is enforceable at law”).  But see, LCIA Arbitration Rules, London Court 
of International Arbitration, art. 32.2 (2014 Amendments) available at 
http://www.lcia.org/Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2014. 
aspx [perma.cc/H7NC-7MA9] ("[T]he Arbitral Tribunal [. . .] shall make every rea-
sonable effort to ensure that any award is legally recognised and enforceable at the 
arbitral seat. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
61 Stavros Brekoulakis, On Arbitrability: Persisting Misconceptions and New 
Areas of Concern, in ARBITRABILITY: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVES, International Arbitration Law Library, Vol. 19, at ¶ 2-36 (Loukas 
Mistelis & Stavros Brekoulakis eds., 2009) (noting that arbitral tribunals can con-
sider the mandatory rules of a country other than the governing law chosen by the 
parties, and “[u]ltimately, it is upon the arbitrator deciding the particular case 
whether to take the enforcement factor into account or not”). 
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application of mandatory law.62  In general, European courts have 
been most favorable to the concept of mandatory law,63 though the 
United States has also required that U.S. antitrust principles be 
considered where “the effects of the underlying agreement [is] felt 
in the United States.”64  Critics argue that the practice ignores the 
intention—and explicit choice—of the parties.65  Others have 
suggested that applying mandatory law is unprincipled and 
politically motivated, bringing the field of arbitration into 
disrepute.66  Nevertheless, this practice continues widely.67 
2.2. Choice of Mandatory Law 
Assuming the conflicts of laws analysis in a given jurisdiction 
allows the application of mandatory laws to antitrust disputes, the 
next inquiry is to decide which mandatory law to apply.  The parties 
in arbitration may have assets in multiple jurisdictions, and given 
that awards can be annulled on public policy grounds the law of the 
arbitral seat must also be considered.68  The latter concern means an 
arbitral tribunal can effectually only apply a foreign mandatory 
antitrust law which does not conflict with, and preferably 
synergizes with, the law of the arbitral seat.69   
                                                     
62 Brower, supra note 48, at 1147 (“Given the vast differences in approach by 
national courts, tribunals may devote more or less attention to local mandatory 
laws depending on the anticipated level of judicial review at the seat of arbitra-
tion.”). 
63 Id. at 1148-52. 
64 Thomas H. Webster & Michael Buhler, Handbook of ICC Arbitration: Com-
mentary, Precedents, Materials 314 ¶ 21-58 (Sweet & Maxwell eds., 2014). 
65 Brower, Supra note 48, at 1129-30 (mandatory laws . . . enable adjudicators 
to apply important regulatory norms enacted by the place of adjudication . . . with-
out regard to (and often in contravention to) private agreements about the govern-
ing law.”). 
66 Id. at 1138 n. 32, citing PHILLIP LANDOLT, MODERNISED EC COMPETITION LAW 
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ¶6-07, at 108 (2006) (“[The failure to apply manda-
tory laws] brings arbitration into disrepute and thus jeopardizes it as an institu-
tion”). 
67 Id. at 1128 n. 4 (quoting leading commentators on the increasing application 
of mandatory law to antirust issues); REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 205-07 ¶¶ 
3.128 – 3.135 (“[P]erhaps the most frequently encountered instance of the applica-
tion of mandatory law is competition or anti-trust law”). 
68 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V(1)(e) (Enforcement may be re-
fused if an award “has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the 
country in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”). 
69 Note that because of the annulment issue, tribunals will be more likely to 
favor applying the law of the arbitral seat even though this may conflict with the 
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The choice of law is important because jurisdictions differ 
substantially in their approach to antitrust policy.70  Antitrust laws 
in the United States focus on consumer protection, are hostile to 
highly concentrated markets, and are less focused on regulating 
efficiency.71  In contrast, European Union competition laws seek to 
further economic integration between member states, raising the 
economic competitiveness of worse-off nations, and promoting the 
free-flow of goods across borders.72  Initially focused on private law 
issues, the European Union has only recently taken on a more 
regulatory function in the realm of competition law.73   
On the other hand, Switzerland74 has taken a contrary position 
                                                     
governing law of the contract or create enforcement issues in the jurisdiction of the 
losing party.  The calculus is that an award enforceable only in the jurisdiction of 
the losing party would be useless if it could be annulled in the national courts of 
the arbitral seat.  See generally, BERNARD HANOTIAU, THE LAW APPLICABLE TO 
ARBITRABILITY, IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND 
AWARDS: 40 YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION, ICCA CONGRESS 
SERIES, Vol. 9, 158 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 1998) (outlining the factors an arbi-
trator will apply when deciding whether to apply foreign policy considerations to 
questions of arbitrability).  
70 C.f., Kyle Robertson, One Law to Control Them All: International Merger Anal-
ysis in the Wake of GE/Honeywell, 31 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 153 (2008) (noting that 
U.S. and E.U. antitrust regulators came to opposite conclusions concerning the pro-
posed GE-Honeywell merger); Dianne P. Wood, International Harmonization of An-
titrust Law: The Tortoise or the Hare?, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 391, 405-406 (2002) (comparing 
differing approaches in OECD countries versus developing countries to questions 
of national treatment in antitrust laws, and suggesting that developing countries 
are motivated by different policy objectives of spreading economic wealth among 
locals). 
71 Eleanor Fox, US and EU Competition Law: A Comparison, in GLOBAL 
COMPETITION POLICY 339, 340-341 (Edward Montgomery Graham & J. David Rich-
ardson eds., 1997).  See also Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (banning actual or at-
tempted monopolization and the restraint of trade). 
72 Fox, supra note 71, at 339, 340-341; see also, Treaty of Rome, European Com-
munity, art. 85(3) (1957) (Mergers that would otherwise be voidable may be ex-
empted if they “[contribute] to improving the production or distribution of goods 
or to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair 
share of the resulting benefit”) available at http://ec.europa.eu/                       com-
petition/legislation/treaties/ec/art81_en.html [perma.cc/W89Q-5JDD] 
73 Hannah L. Buxbaum, The Private Attorney General in a Global Age: Public In-
terests in Private International Antitrust Litigation, 26 YALE J. INT’L L. 219, 226 (2001).   
74 Brower, supra note 48, at 1159 (noting that “parties wishing to avoid Euro-
pean competition law reportedly provided for Swiss arbitration” but were unsuc-
cessful as the Swiss Federal Tribunal later held EU competition laws nevertheless 
applicable); see Tribunale federale [DTF] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 13, 1998, X 
SA v. Y SA, Judgment of Nov. 13, 1998, 25 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 511, 513 (Switz.) (hold-
ing that arbitrators must consider EU competition law when the parties are from 
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on the subject of mandatory law, and professed that antitrust law is 
not a matter of international public policy.75  Though EU 
competition law may still apply in cases where the parties have 
sufficient ties to the European Union, under Swiss law “an award 
rendered in Switzerland may not be set aside due to an incorrect 
application of EU competition law by the arbitrators.”76  By 
comparison, Switzerland is therefore far less concerned with 
controlling the application of a coherent antitrust law policy than 
either the United States or the European Union.   
It is important to remember that arbitral tribunals are the 
product of contract law, and therefore serve a different role in 
society than courts.77  As more national courts and arbitral tribunals 
find antitrust issues arbitrable, it will become impossible for 
arbitrators to avoid ruling on these issues.  While national courts 
have often elected to dismiss claims based on foreign antitrust laws, 
foreign regulatory interests have not been ignored in the choice of 
law analysis.78  Further, an international arbitration tribunal by its 
very nature does not have the authority to decline jurisdiction on the 
basis that a claim is based on foreign law—nor should it.  Therefore 
an arbitrator’s consideration of appropriate foreign regulatory 
interests in issuing an arbitral award is a natural extension of 
established practice.  The point is that arbitration has the potential 
to improve the way parties resolve disputes, and these benefits are 
stifled by holding arbitrations to the same public policy objectives 
as national courts.  
2.3. Joinder 
Joinder presents a particular difficulty in the context of antitrust 
arbitration because it further complicates the choice of law analysis.  
As a theoretical matter, the joinder of an additional party should not 
alter the choice of law applicable to a given dispute between the 
                                                     
the EU and one party invokes its provisions). 
75 Tribunale federale [TF] [Federal Supreme Court] Nov. 13, 1998, X SA v. Y 
SA, 25 Y.B. Comm. Arb. 511, 513 (Switz). 
76 KLAUS PETER BERGER, CORRECTION, INTERPRETATION AND SETTING ASIDE OF THE 
AWARD, IN PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: NEGOTIATION, 
MEDIATION, ARBITRATION 665 (3rd ed. 2015). 
77 Rau, supra note 26, at 53 (“[A]rbitration, as part of a process of private gov-
ernment and self-determination, should be understood through the lenses of con-
tract rather than of adjudication.”).  
78 Buxbaum, supra note 73, at 235-237. 
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existing parties.79  However, a conflict may arise where the 
additional party is located in a jurisdiction different from the parties 
who are already part of the arbitration, thus implicating an 
alternate—and possibly conflicting—mandatory law.  Parties may 
be joined either as additional claimants or respondents, however the 
choice of law issues are more likely to be determinative when a party 
is joined as respondent as this is the party against whom an award 
is most likely to be issued.  Additionally, parties joined as 
respondents are also more likely to raise defenses based on antitrust 
law.   
Thus, an arbitral tribunal deciding which antitrust law to apply 
in multiparty arbitration must seek to harmonize the potentially 
conflicting mandates of (1) the law of the arbitral seat, (2) the laws 
of the most likely jurisdiction where enforcement against 
respondent parties would be sought, (3) the laws of the jurisdiction 
of any of the claimant parties against which a counterclaim based in 
antitrust law has been raised, and potentially (4) the law of the 
jurisdiction of the additional party to be joined.  Given the current 
state of affairs, this is at times an impossible task.  
3.  SOLUTIONS FOR ARBITRATORS 
The following discussion will demonstrate the ways in which all 
of the current solutions available to arbitral tribunals are 
inadequate.  All have the potential to leave the whole or part of an 
award unenforceable.  Especially for larger awards, the winning 
party may need to apply for enforcement in multiple jurisdictions.  
The tribunal can only choose to apply one country’s governing law 
at a time.  As the quote at the opening of this comment depicts, when 
faced with conflicting mandates a tribunal is always left to 
disappoint one jurisdiction or another.   
In all cases the tribunal will need to determine whether a 
fundamental tension between competing antitrust laws exists.  If all 
potential rules would make available the same rights and remedies 
to the parties, and yield substantially the same result on the facts, 
the issue need not be decided.  However, given that many countries 
have resisted harmonization of antitrust laws,80 this outcome is 
                                                     
79 HANOTIAU, supra note 35, at 183 (interpreting experience with a case where 
the CEPANI appointments committee declined consolidation which would have 
required the resolution of additional issues under a different applicable law).  
80 John McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust Harmonization, 
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unlikely in all but a minority of multiparty and joinder cases.81   
Under the current state of affairs, if the antitrust policies in the 
various place of enforcement differ substantially, the tribunal may 
not be able to write a sufficiently enforceable award.  Tribunals can 
resolve this tension in a number of ways, some of which are more or 
less consistent with the fundamental premises of arbitration.  This 
section will consider the costs and benefits of the most practical 
options, and suggest ways to minimize risk.  As always, tribunals 
must work within the limits of their authority or face non-
enforcement.82   
3.1. Law of the Seat 
The law of the seat is relevant for two main reasons:  (1) national 
courts can set aside arbitral awards on public policy grounds,83 and 
(2) the choice of seat may be interpreted as explicit consent by the 
parties to be subject to its laws.84  As discussed, the public policy 
ground for annulment is the justification for applying mandatory 
antitrust law.  Competition law statutes are considered matters of 
public policy in many jurisdictions, and in many jurisdictions a 
losing party could apply to the national court “in the place the 
award was made” to annul an award on antitrust or other regulatory 
issues if the law applied does not conform to local law.85  Perhaps 
for this reason, some jurisdictions have also interpreted the explicit 
choice of the seat as an implicit agreement to be bound by public 
policy choices of the arbitral seat.86  
                                                     
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 593 (2003) (arguing against antitrust harmonization 
because it has high agency costs and reduces long-run experimentation and inno-
vation in antitrust). 
81 See also, Rau, supra note 26, at 89 (noting that the explanatory force of an 
arbitral tribunal’s reasoning declines as the number of considered laws and juris-
dictions increases). 
82 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V. (stating the conditions under 
which an authority could refuse to enforce the award). 
83 BORN, supra note 6, at 3163-64 (noting that many national arbitration statutes 
and the UNCITRAL Model Law allow for annulment in the place the award was 
made on the ground that “the award is contrary to public policy”). see also 
UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 2, at art. 34(2)(b)(ii) (“An award may be set 
aside [by a national court if] the court finds that: [. . .] the award is in conflict with 
the public policy of this State.”). 
84 Rau, supra note 26, at 74-75.  
85 BORN, supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
86 BORN, supra note 6, at 622 note 10(c) (“[N]ational courts in the arbitral seat 
are usually competent (and exclusively competent) to entertain actions to annul or 
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3.2. Governing Law of the Contract 
The obvious solution would be to apply the governing law of the 
contract, or lex contractus.  This body of law may be the same or 
different as that of the arbitral seat, and hopefully the governing law 
is at least compatible with the lex arbitri.87  What if a mismatch exists 
between the antitrust policies under the law of the seat and the law 
of the contract? 
Under the current practice tribunals would be wise to defer to 
the law of the seat.  An unenforceable award is of little use to the 
prevailing party.  Given the widely accepted (though misguided) 
application of mandatory law under the guise of public policy, the 
safer choice for an arbitral tribunal is to opt for the law of the arbitral 
seat so as to avoid annulment there.  This outcome should seem 
unfair; after all it violates the explicit choice of the parties.  This 
example demonstrates the fundamental problem with the way 
antitrust laws are currently handled in arbitration.  The better 
solution would be for arbitral tribunals to issue awards based on the 
law of the contract, and for national courts to enforce them even 
when they conflict with the public policy objectives under national 
law.  This argument is discussed further below.88 
3.3. Place Where Conduct Occurred 
The law of the place where alleged misconduct occurs is clearly 
legally relevant.  To that end, some arbitrators have even found it 
inappropriate for arbitral tribunals to apply mandatory law to the 
extent that (1) the parties chose an alternate governing law and (2) 
the allegedly violative conduct occurred outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the law governing the dispute.89  To do so would 
                                                     
set aside” awards, and that some jurisdictions allow very limited review while oth-
ers allow “extensive public policy inquiries.”); see also, BORN, supra note 6, at 979 
note 21(b)) (citing ICC Award No. 4132 for the proposition that “an arbitrator’s 
overriding duty is to render an enforceable award, and impliedly that this requires 
consideration of public policy defenses and claims). 
87 See supra § 2. 
88 See infra §5.1. 
89 Rau, supra note 26, at 59 (citing ICC Case No.6320, XX Y.B Comm. Arb. 62 
(ICC Int'l Ct. Arb.) at ¶¶ 151, 159 and stating that “even if” American courts were 
to interpret the statute as calling for the application of treble damages in such a case, 
“the acceptable interest to stop activities such as those covered by RICO also out-
side the United States is not, by itself, sufficient to lead to mandatory extraterritorial 
application in international arbitration.”). 
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imply that the nation promulgating such laws “has some sort of 
police authority for international trade outside [its] territory” or that 
the laws were a representative “expression of ‘international public 
policy.’”90  Thus, arbitral tribunals must not only consider whether 
a choice of law has jurisdiction over the parties, but also whether 
there is jurisdiction over the present dispute. 
3.4. Finding the Money 
Alternatively, the tribunal could choose to apply the mandatory 
law of the country where enforcement of the largest portion of the 
award would likely to be required.  The benefit to the plaintiff would 
be that both antitrust as well as other related claims would be 
resolved in a single arbitration, while ensuring that at least the most 
significant portion of the claim will be enforceable.  This procedure 
however would greatly disadvantage the defendant, who may raise 
an objection to unequal treatment on the grounds that the plaintiff 
would receive greater control over the parameters of the arbitration.  
Allowing the plaintiff to forum shop for the jurisdictional rules that 
would result in the largest enforcement capabilities would impose a 
policy choice on the parties that is necessarily pro-antitrust 
enforcement.  Before doing so, however, the tribunal should make a 
holistic assessment of the various policies governing the parties, and 
ensure that any implicit policy choice comports with fundamental 
fairness.  Nevertheless, the procedural fairness objections are not the 
only problem with implementing this strategy.  
This solution is problematic because the reasoning is inherently 
circular.  The place of enforcement will depend on who the 
successful party is, which in turn may depend on which law is 
applied.91  Moreover, it may be unclear which party faces the largest 
potential liability, or where the most significant assets of that party 
are located.  Choosing the governing law in this way could 
potentially be arbitrary, and would therefore be subject to 
criticism.92   
                                                     
90 Id. at ¶ 156. 
91 Rau, supra note 26, at 82. 
92 Born, supra note 6, at 2615 (“[D]ifferences between national laws and proce-
dures can be great . . . the need for predictability and stability is particularly sub-
stantial and . . . the risks of arbitraty or discriminatory legislative or judicial actions 
are especially acute [in international commercial matters].”) 
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3.5. Applying Multiple Mandatory Laws 
Particularly in multiparty arbitrations, the tribunal could end up 
applying different mandatory laws to each claim against each 
respondent—in effect, joining the claims for purposes of the 
proceeding and then severing them before issuing the arbitral 
award.  Ironically, such an approach could actually hasten 
innovation and improve antitrust regulations worldwide.  Some 
have argued that arbitration in general tests the “inherent 
soundness” of established law, and allows tribunals to consider 
more freely “whether the policy underlying the rule has truly been 
implicated.”93  Moreover, in the case of multiparty arbitration, 
applying multiple mandatory laws could create a forum to directly 
compare the results of different rules applied to the same set of 
facts.94  This information, to the extent that it becomes available,95 
could then be used by legislatures to tailor national competition 
laws to more reliably achieve their desired outcomes.   
Although the application of multiple mandatory antitrust laws 
to different parties in a multiparty arbitration would address some 
concerns, this solution is painfully imperfect.  The law of the arbitral 
seat may still conflict with the law of the most likely place of 
enforcement, or it may be unclear where the enforcement will 
eventually be sought.  Non-enforceable awards could still result.  
There is also a chance that the results would be inconsistent as 
between the parties.  This may negatively affect the parties’ 
relationship, particularly if one party is treated less favorably 
compared to the same conduct arising out of the same contract.   
Furthermore, this solution comes at a substantial financial cost.  
While there are some efficiency gains from holding a single 
proceeding to decide common questions of fact between the parties, 
there may be few common questions of law.  When applying 
                                                     
93 Rau, supra note 26, at 87. 
94 Provided of course the parties allow the opinions to be published.  See 2015 
International Arbitration Survey: Improvements and Innovations in International Arbitra-
tion, Queen Mary Univ. London, White & Case LLP at 22 (“The suggestion that 
institutions should publish awards in redacted form (and/or as summaries was ac-
cordingly . . . favoured for its academic value and usefulness when arguing a case. 
. . .”) available at http://arbitration.qmul.ac.uk/docs/164761.pdf.  
95 This does not mean that confidentiality could not be maintained.  Scholarly 
commentators and even arbitral institutions sometimes publish case notes includ-
ing the arguments advanced and the legal conclusions reached by the tribunal.  To 
protect confidentiality, the names and identifying facts are redacted or omitted. 
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different substantive laws to the parties, counsel will need to make 
separate submissions to the tribunal, and the arbitrators will have to 
expend time and effort crafting individual awards based on various 
legal standards.  This duplication of effort increases the financial 
costs of this dispute resolution mechanism, and could be avoided if 
a single governing law (such as the law of the contract) could be 
applied in an enforceable way. 
3.6. Refusing Joinder 
The least likely resolution would be for the tribunal to refuse 
joinder of any additional party with a conflicting mandatory law.  
Tribunals have discretion under the institutional rules that allow 
joinder.96  The benefit of this tactic is that it avoids the issuance of an 
award which would likely be unenforceable, while potentially 
preserving a claim against the additional party.  However, this 
option is unattractive because it potentially violates the parties’ right 
to arbitrate against the parties of their choosing and may result in 
multiple proceedings on similar issues.  Despite the conflict of law 
issues and the attendant enforcement difficulties the parties may 
still prefer to hold a joint arbitration with all the relevant parties.   
4.  IMPLICATIONS 
The point of arbitration is to generate an enforceable award.  
What good is winning on the merits in a dispute if one cannot collect 
the spoils?  The problems created by the application of mandatory 
antitrust laws in arbitration lead parties to engage in inefficient and 
negative-value behavior that undermines the benefits to 
international arbitration.  Specifically, parties are incentivized to 
engage in forum shopping at the enforcement and adjudication 
stages, and to waste resources by spending additional time drafting 
strategic arbitration clauses.   
4.1. Forum Shopping 
Forum shopping may occur at the enforcement stage.  Winning 
parties will try to enforce their award in jurisdictions with favorable 
antitrust laws, and in fact may have to apply to multiple 
                                                     
96 LEW, supra note 36, at 289-290 (describing the standards for third-party join-
der under the LCIA and CCIG arbitration rules and noting that tribunals have final 
discretion).  
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jurisdictions in order to collect the full amount of an award.97  
Worryingly, parties may even be tempted to argue the enforcement 
prospects at the adjudication stage to encourage the arbitral tribunal 
to apply the competition laws of a particular jurisdiction (which is 
otherwise unconnected to the dispute) when rendering the award.  
For example, if a claimant becomes aware that respondent has assets 
located in a jurisdiction favorable to antitrust enforcement, the 
claimant may urge the tribunal to apply the substantive antitrust 
laws of that jurisdiction even in the face of other substantive laws 
that have a closer nexus to the dispute.  This is problematic because 
it adds uncertainty and increases the cost of arbitration by inviting 
spurious argumentation choice of law issues.   
A tribunal may be swayed by such arguments to the extent that 
producing enforceable awards affects the ability of an arbitrator to 
obtain future appointments.  No one wants to hire an arbitrator who 
has a history of producing unenforceable awards.  Not only will the 
disappointed party who was unable to enforce their award be 
disinclined to hire or recommend their arbitrators in the future, but 
other potential clients will know not to hire those arbitrators since—
unlike arbitral awards—enforcement proceedings are publically 
available because they must be filed in open court.  
Conversely, parties seeking to avoid enforceability will have 
every incentive to disperse their assets to more favorable 
jurisdictions.  Given the premise that awards will only be 
enforceable where the award conforms to national public policy 
interests, a losing party could avoid paying damages on an award 
simply by moving their assets to jurisdictions that have adopted 
policies inconsistent with those applied in the award.  This may not 
be possible in every case, but even if it happens only in a small 
fraction of cases this has the potential to seriously vitiate the benefits 
of resolving antitrust disputes in international arbitration.  Thus, 
forum shopping both in favor of and opposed to antitrust 
regulations will lead to a lack of uniformity, unfair applications of 
foreign law, and skewed results in arbitration.   
                                                     
97 Rau, supra note 26, at 82 (citing the “the transitory nature of ‘assets’ in an 
electronic world” as one factor making it “impossible for the arbitrators to predict 
with any accuracy just which jurisdictions may later be called on to recognize an 
award.”). 
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4.2. For Drafting Arbitration Agreements 
Given the extensive reach asserted by their national courts,98 
companies with strong ties in the European Union or the United 
States are unable to “contract out” of statutory antitrust 
enforcement.  The goal in drafting arbitration agreements therefore 
should be to mitigate the potential problems should a multiparty 
international arbitration on antitrust issues occur.  An explicit choice 
of antitrust law in an arbitration agreement alone would not be 
effective.  Fearing non-enforcement, tribunals have shown a 
willingness to ignore explicit selections in favor of unpredictable 
mandatory law.99  
The most effective tool in drafting an arbitration agreement in 
anticipation of possible multiparty antitrust arbitration would be to 
select an arbitral seat and a set of institutional rules whose policies 
match the enforcement profile of the parties.  Parties whose business 
plan involves taking advantage of economies of scale should seek 
the protection of rules that favor free markets and non-
intervention.100  Small businesses and new market entrants who 
                                                     
98 See Kyle Robertson, One Law to Control Them All: International Merger Analysis 
in the Wake of GE/Honeywell, 31 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 153 (2008) (discussing the 
implications of the European Commission’s blocking of the proposed merger be-
tween two U.S. companies: GE and Honeywell).  C.f., Dimitrios-Panagiotis L. 
Tzakas, Civil Antitrust Liability in the International Context: From Empagran to the Rome 
II Regulation, 37 DAJV NEWSLETTER 19 (2012) (reviewing the history of extraterrito-
rial enforcement of antitrust laws by U.S. and European courts); Juliette Gardside, 
From Google to Amazon: EU goes to war against powers of US digital giants, GUARDIAN, 
(Jul. 5, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/ 
2014/jul/06/google-amazon-europe-goes-to-war-power-digital-giants           
[perma.cc/E69B-E9EC] (describing European regulators investigation and criticism 
of U.S. based company Google for its near monopoly of internet searches in Europe 
likening it to a threat to national sovereignty). 
99 See Brower, supra note 48. 
100 E.g. Switzerland when none of the parties is based in an E.U. member state. 
Switzerland has historically engaged in limited antitrust enforcement, and unlike 
in the U.S. consumers in Switzerland do not have standing to bring private suits to 
enforce antitrust laws. Bernhard C. Lauterburg and Philipp E. Zurkinden, Ch. 25: 
Switzerland in THE PRIVATE COMPETITION ENFORCEMENT REVIEW at 360 (7th ed. 2014); 
But see, Federal Tribunal [TF] [Swiss Supreme Court] Mar. 8, 2006, 4P.278/2005 at 
¶ 3.2 (Switz.) (refusing to annul arbitral award for violation of public policy when 
it applied European competition laws to European parties). In general, smaller 
economies that are open to trade have less incentive for strong antitrust enforce-
ment because concentrated domestic companies are more competitive abroad and 
the negative domestic effects of monopolization are limited by the fact that most of 
the goods are exported abroad. MICHAEL UTTON, INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
POLICY: MAINTAINING OPEN MARKETS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 100 (2006). 
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depend on stronger market regulation should instead opt for 
jurisdictions with a history of antitrust enforcement.101  Where 
possible, the law of the seat should be same as the governing law of 
the contract, or at least not have opposing policy objectives.  
Particularly for non-European parties, Switzerland is an attractive 
arbitral seat because they have taken a hostile view of mandatory 
antitrust law.102   
Confidentiality agreements should be used in order to avoid 
attracting the attention of public regulatory agencies or other 
potential plaintiffs.  In the context of antitrust arbitration, 
confidentiality is important because regulatory agencies may be able 
to initiate parallel proceedings, apply for a stay of the arbitral 
proceeding pending the resolution of their own investigation, or 
pressure the parties into holding concurrent proceedings or sharing 
evidence.103  Importantly, the agencies serve interests other than, 
and possibly adverse to, those of the parties in arbitration.  The 
parties will wish to resolve their private disputes in a speedy and 
cost-effective manner, whereas the administrative agencies serve 
much broader interests.   
Additionally, confidentiality of the award is important so as not 
to encourage additional proceedings filed by third-party 
stakeholders.  Imagine an arbitration concerning a claim for breach 
of contract, where the responding party successfully invokes a claim 
for unfair trade practices.  Since the arbitration is only binding on 
the parties in the proceeding, there will be other potential claimants 
who may now wish to invoke an unfair trade practices claim against 
the original claimant.  If the award remains confidential, those 
potential claimants are less likely to become aware that they have a 
claim, and also will not be able to rely on any of the findings in the 
arbitral proceedings either to aid in their discovery or as persuasive 
evidence in court.   
Note also that this arrangement does not disadvantage the 
winning party in arbitration.  The respondent’s claim will already 
                                                     
101 E.g., members of the European Union, the United States. See generally, Barak 
Orbach, The Antitrust Curse of Bigness, 85 Southern L. Rev. 605-655 (2012) (describ-
ing the evolution of American antitrust law as premised on trust busting); UTTON, 
supra note 100, at 100 (describing the US and EU as having the most “highly devel-
oped and comprehensive policies” on antitrust enforcement). 
102 See generally Berger, supra note 76, and accompanying text; supra note 100 
and accompanying text. 
103 See supra § 1.1. 
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have been satisfied, and if anything the award may be easier to 
collect if the other party is keen to avoid having it filed publicly in 
court.104  Lastly, at the time the arbitration agreement is concluded 
the parties will not know against whom a statutory antitrust claim 
will be made, thereby both parties benefit from the protection of a 
pre-emptive confidentiality clause compared to a post-dispute 
agreement which will be harder to negotiate once a dispute has 
arisen.105   
5.  POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Enforcement of Foreign Antitrust Laws 
National courts should accept the application of foreign antitrust 
laws and enforce antitrust awards based on the governing law of the 
contract like they would any other.  Piecemeal rejection of the 
governing law contractually chosen by the Parties is inimical to 
international arbitration doctrine.  The purpose of the New York 
Convention was “to encourage the recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards.”106  The status quo of refusing to 
enforce awards on public policy grounds is inconsistent with this 
goal.   
The New York Convention does expressly allow for the 
annulment or refusal to enforce an award on public policy 
grounds,107 but this exception was not meant to have such far-
reaching effects.108  A public policy exception was necessary to 
convince countries to give up substantial sovereignty by agreeing to 
use the jurisdiction of their courts to enforce judgments they had no 
hand in shaping.  The exception should not become the rule.  
Denying enforcement unless a specific mandatory law is applied 
                                                     
104 BORN, supra note 6, at 2801 (noting that even where confidentiality agree-
ments exists, awards can be made public in enforcement actions); REDFERN & 
HUNTER, supra note 4, at 140 ¶ 2.159 (discussing the view that awards filed in court 
for enforcement purposes become public documents). 
105 REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 136 ¶ 2.145 (noting that confidentiality 
agreements can be negotiated at the time of contracting or at the outset of arbitra-
tion). 
106 GAILLARD, supra note 3, at 126, citing Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 
928, 932 (2nd Cir. 1983). 
107 New York Convention, supra note 7, art. V.  
108 BORN, supra note 6, at 3661 (arguing that the structure and objectives of the 
Convention suggest that member states cannot use national public policy to effec-
tively repudiate their obligations under Articles III and V). 
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constitutes an end-run on a national court’s obligations under the 
New York Convention.   
Allowing the resolution of private antitrust law claims in 
binding international arbitration is precisely the type of incursion on 
national sovereignty to which the member states agreed when 
signing the New York Convention.109  Arbitration is a give and take.  
In exchange for enforcing arbitral awards rendered under foreign 
law, states are assured that awards rendered under their own law 
will also be enforced with limited scrutiny.  The same could be true 
for antitrust law claims.  If national courts were to enforce awards 
based on foreign antitrust law, they would thereby ensure that their 
own citizens (the public whose interest they are keen to protect) are 
able to carry the protections of their own national competition laws 
with them when they do business abroad.  Is that not an interest 
worth protecting?   
Additionally, incursion on national sovereignty in the case of 
antitrust issues is actually quite small.  National courts need not fear 
the slackening of statutory antitrust enforcement or the lack of a 
coherent doctrine,110 because the award is constrained to the 
resolution of issues between the parties to the arbitration111 and no 
new national precedents are set in arbitral awards.  An award would 
not deprive other private or public stake holders the opportunity to 
present related statutory claims in subsequent proceedings.  In fact, 
since arbitral awards normally remain unpublished,112 in many 
cases they cannot even be used as persuasive authority in other 
adjudicatory proceedings.   
The purpose of allowing contracting parties to resolve antitrust 
law issues in arbitration is not to circumvent national laws to which 
the parties would otherwise be subject, but rather to embrace the 
freedom of parties to choose the forum in which to resolve claims 
                                                     
109 Id. 
110 See Blumenthal, supra note 33, at 1525 ¶ 42-053 (consumer protection cases 
“seldom present complex policy choices [and] generally do not pose difficulties in 
maintaining coherent and consistent enforcement.”). 
111 BORN, supra note 6, at 1406 (“[T]he principle that only the parties to an in-
ternational arbitration agreement are either bound or benefitted by that agreement 
is fundamental to international arbitration.”). 
112 See BORN, supra note 6, at 3825 (discussing the limited availability of arbitral 
precedent because most awards are not published); see also LEW, supra note 36, p. 
659 (noting that “arbitration proceedings normally remain confidential” and de-
scribing how voluntarily published opinions serve as a practical source of infor-
mation in other arbitrations). 
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against each other.  Under a strict interpretation of party autonomy, 
parties who derive a benefit from requiring adjudication of antitrust 
issues in national courts could exclude those claims when drafting 
an arbitration agreement.  Ignoring the otherwise fundamental right 
of parties to choose not to the exclude those issues from arbitration 
is paternalistic and misplaced.  International arbitration has proven 
a successful legal innovation to deal, among other things, with 
globalization and backlogged judicial systems.113  Carving out 
exceptions for competition law claims between two private parties 
imposes unnecessary costs and risks losing access to substantial 
benefits.   
5.2. Harmonization of Antitrust Law 
The foreseeable complexity of these issues further highlights the 
potential gains of greater harmonization in antitrust law.114  
National governments could coordinate their antitrust laws to 
produce more consistent rules.  Similar gains have previously been 
achieved in the realm of tariff regulations under the auspices of the 
WTO.115  The advantage of such a regime would be that choice of 
law questions would frequently become immaterial in the context of 
antitrust, thereby increasing predictability and facilitating the 
growth of cross-border business activities.   
Unfortunately there are many obstacles to harmonization.  First, 
countries with different political ideations are unlikely to agree on 
matters of antitrust policy.116  Centrally-planned economies such as 
China have historically favored monopolies, whereas democratic 
governments have encouraged greater market competition.117  
                                                     
113 See LEW, supra note 36, at 7 (explaining that neutrality and expedition are 
some of the primary virtues of arbitration). 
114 See Wood, supra note 71 (“To ‘harmonize’ one country’s [antitrust] law with 
those of another must be a Good Thing.”).  
115 For further discussion on the role of the WTO and intergovernmental agen-
cies, see infra § 5.3. 
116 Stephans, infra note 118, at 185-186 (arguing that politics explains at least of 
the variation in antitrust policy).  
117 See Niels Petersen, Antitrust Law and the Promotion of Democracy and Eco-
nomic Growth, in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE CRITICAL ROLES OF COMPETITION LAW 
AND POLICY, Vol. 2 (Eleanor Fox & Abel Mateus eds. 2011) (finding that antitrust 
law has a stronger effect on economic growth than the level of democracy); But see 
Harry First & Spencer Weber, Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2543 (2013) (discussing how U.S. antitrust enforcement has become increasingly in-
fluenced by partisan politics and therefore less focused on “free” markets). 
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Further, given variations in economic development, it is 
questionable that a one-size-fits-all approach to antitrust would 
even be desirable.118  Depending on the context, businesses 
themselves may oppose harmonization.119  Finally, some have 
argued that harmonization would inflict high agency costs and 
would restrict legal innovation.120   
Thus harmonization could solve part of the mandatory antitrust 
law problem, but it comes with so many attendant difficulties that it 
is unattractive in practice.  Depending on antitrust law 
harmonization to solve the multiparty mandatory law problem is 
like taking a shower to get ketchup off your thumb.  It’ll work, but 
it would be much easier to just wash your hands.  Enforcing awards 
based on the antitrust law policies of the governing law of the 
contract (regardless of whether it concords with local practice or not) 
is the hand-washing solution in this case.   
5.3. Intergovernmental Organizations 
Some have argued that an intergovernmental agency or 
international trade organization could most efficiently resolve 
international antitrust issues,121 however the preceding discussion 
on multiparty arbitration demonstrates just a few of the drawbacks 
of such a proposal.  National courts have ignored the otherwise 
established principles of party autonomy in order to evade the 
                                                     
118 See McGinnis, supra note 80, at 556 (describing reasons why antitrust policy 
in developed countries is not designed to maximize consumer welfare).  
119 Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the 
WTO, 48 HARV. INT'L L. J. 383, 428 (2007) (noting that corporations are likely to favor 
harmonization on merger rules, but oppose confluence of rules governing market 
dominance or cartels). 
120 McGinnis, supra note 80 at 554-68. 
121 Andrew T. Guzman, The Case for International Antitrust, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L 
L. 355, 359 (2004) (contending that a unified regime is necessary in part because 
current choice of law rules result in inefficient regulation); Robertson, supra note 71, 
at 156-157 (discussing how states’ individual competition laws have led to failed 
applications);  But see Alex Lawson, WTO a Tough Venue to Challenge China on Anti-
trust Law, LAW 360 (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/ 
576691/wto-a-tough-venue-to-challenge-china-on-antitrust-law [perma.cc/X8LZ-
ZYMZ] (last visited February 1, 2016) (discussing why cases challenging the une-
qual application of antitrust laws in the WTO are rare); Bradford, supra note 117, at 
384-85 (arguing that strategic interests make a unified antitrust regime at the WTO 
unattractive); Paul Stephans, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of Interna-
tional Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 173, 209 (2005) (“[G]iving an international 
agency responsibility for supervising how states exercise their jurisdiction would 
lead to the exact same agency problems” as allowing them to self-regulate). 
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perceived incursion on national sovereignty to decide fundamental 
issues of domestic public policy.122  The establishment of an 
international antitrust adjudicative body or adjudication under the 
WTO123 would not alleviate these concerns.   
Further, establishing an international organization would do 
very little to alleviate the drawbacks of parallel or dual track 
proceedings.124  The field of international arbitration has grown out 
of a desire to resolve disputes efficiently125 and in a neutral forum,126 
and national courts have repeatedly enforced the right of parties to 
define the scope of issues to be decided in arbitration.127  Parties need 
to be able to raise antitrust defenses in arbitration, and an 
intergovernmental organization is no substitute for binding 
arbitration specifically tailored to meet the needs of the parties.   
6.  CONCLUSION 
Mandatory antitrust law is a thorn in the side of international 
arbitration.  As multiparty arbitrations increasingly address 
competition law issues, tribunals must grapple with the tension 
between party autonomy and possibly conflicting mandatory laws.  
The application of mandatory antitrust laws in multiparty 
arbitration has the potential to produce uncertainty, forum-
shopping, and conflicting results.   
Having established the arbitrability of an antitrust issue in a 
multiparty arbitration, arbitrators will have to weigh a number of 
considerations in determining which mandatory law should apply.  
                                                     
122 See supra § 1.1. 
123 See Kukovec, supra note 5, at 43-45 (analyzing whether the WTO should be 
given a role in international antitrust adjudication). 
124 See supra §1.1. 
125 See BORN, supra note 7, at 61 (“Procedural flexibility, informality and effi-
ciency were key attributes of the arbitral process, and central to the business com-
munity’s preference for arbitration.”).  See also, ICC Arbitration Rules, supra note 
56, at art. 22 (“[T]he arbitral tribunal and the parties shall make every effort to con-
duct the arbitration in an expeditious and cost-effective manner, having regard to 
the complexity and value of the dispute.”). 
126 See REDFERN & HUNTER, supra note 4, at 32 ¶¶ 1.90-1.91 (describing the ad-
vantage of resolving an international dispute before a neutral tribunal). 
127 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (holding that the parties 
agreed to arbitrate statutory antitrust claim); But see, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd., Case 
C-126/97 (holding that national courts must raise domestic antitrust issues as a 
matter of public policy when deciding whether to enforce and award—regardless 
of whether the issue was raised by the parties in arbitration).  
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Ideally, tribunals would respect party autonomy and only apply the 
governing law of the contract to antitrust claims that arise in 
connection with the contract.  However, due to enforcement 
concerns the law of the arbitral seat and the laws of the most likely 
places of enforcement must also be considered.  As a last resort 
tribunals could apply different mandatory laws to various parties or 
refuse joinder of an additional party with a conflicting applicable 
mandatory law.   
The preceding discussion demonstrates the need for change at 
the level of national courts.  International arbitration depends on the 
broad enforceability of awards.128  States that have signed the New 
York Convention have a responsibility to recognize awards made 
under foreign law, and this should include antitrust laws.  
Alternative solutions such as the harmonization of national antitrust 
laws or the creation of an intergovernmental regulatory scheme are 
problematic and ultimately less attractive solutions.  Resolution of 
antitrust issues in binding arbitration allows private parties to 
efficiently resolve disputes with minimal incursion on national 
sovereignty.   
The scope of this problem is not limited to antitrust issues.  
Similar concerns arise in other areas of law that strongly implicate 
public policy, such as environmental law, intellectual property law, 
and securities regulation.129  Likewise, though the use of class 
actions in international arbitration is still rare,130 developments in 
that sphere may further complicate this analysis in the future.  What 
is an arbitrator to do?  Proceed carefully, and hope the award is 
enforced.   
 
 
                                                     
128 BORN, supra note 6, at 102 (noting that mandatory recognition of awards, 
subject only extremely limited exceptions, is an extremely innovative feature of the 
New York Convention). 
129 Brower, supra note 48, at 1130 (listing common examples of mandatory 
laws). 
130 See S.I. Strong, Enforcing Class Arbitration in the International Sphere, 30 U. PA. 
J. INT’L L. 1, (2008) (identifying emerging issues in international class arbitration); 
Kessler, supra note 16 (discussing antitrust class arbitration in U.S. domestic con-
text) citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (upholding 
class arbitration waiver in form contract). 
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